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GLD-289        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2226 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  GERALD S. LEPRE, JR. 
   Appellant 
 
Gerald S. Lepre, Jr. 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ECMC; 
PHEAA Student Loan Foundation Inc. & Sallie Mae Inc. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-12-cv-00545) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 20, 2013 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 3, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 
Gerald S. Lepre, Jr., appeals pro se from an order of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the United States 
Bankruptcy Court’s order entering judgment in favor of ECMC and against Lepre in the 
adversary proceeding.  Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order.    
I. 
In 2011, Lepre filed for relief pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United 
States Code, and filed an adversary complaint against, amongst others, the Pennsylvania 
Higher Education Assistance Agency d/b/a American Education Services (“AES”) and 
Sallie Mae, Inc., in order to obtain a discharge of his educational loans.  Subsequently, 
Appellee Educational Credit Management Corporation (“ECMC”) was substituted for 
AES, and the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Sallie Mae from the adversary proceeding.
1
    
 In his complaint, Lepre sought a discharge of his educational debt pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), arguing that he faced an undue burden in repaying it.  In March 2012, 
the Bankruptcy Court, after a trial on the merits, held that Lepre failed to meet the 
standard for undue hardship outlined in Brunner v. New York Higher Education Services 
Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (adopted by this Court in Pennsylvania Higher 
Education Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 1995)), and 
                                              
1
 The Bankruptcy Court found that it was undisputed that Sallie Mae was not a creditor of Lepre, and therefore no 
case existed.  While Lepre continued to reference Sallie Mae in his appeal to the District Court and in his responses 
to the instant appeal, the District Court order being appealed only concerns ECMC.  Lepre did not appeal the order 
dismissing Sallie Mae from the adversary proceeding.    
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entered judgment in favor of ECMC.  Lepre timely appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s 
order to the District Court, which rejected Lepre’s arguments in opposition to the 
Bankruptcy Court’s decision, and affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order.  Following the 
District Court’s order, Lepre timely appealed to this Court. 
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).
2
  “On an appeal 
from a bankruptcy case, our review duplicates that of the district court and view[s] the 
bankruptcy court decision unfettered by the district court’s determination.”  In re Orton, 
687 F.3d 612, 614-15 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Thus, we 
review the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact for clear error and apply plenary review to 
its legal conclusions.  Id. at 615. 
III. 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), student loan debt cannot be discharged in 
bankruptcy unless repaying this debt would impose an “undue hardship” on the debtor.  
We, along with the majority of our sister courts, assess whether a debtor faces undue 
hardship by employing the three-pronged test set forth Brunner v. New York Higher 
Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).  See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance 
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 In its response to Lepre’s appeal, ECMC asks that this Court dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the 
ground that the notice of appeal was untimely.  While Lepre’s notice of appeal was filed 31 days after the District 
Court’s order was docketed, the District Court’s order violated the Separate Judgment Rule.  “To be independent of 
the court's opinion [and comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58], an order must be separately titled and captioned, not 
paginated consecutively to the opinion or memorandum, not stapled or otherwise attached to the opinion, and must 
be docketed separately.” LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n, 503 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing In 
re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 454 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2006); Local Union No. 1992 of Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers 
v. Okonite Co., 358 F.3d 278, 284–85 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Accordingly, the District Court’s order was not deemed 
“entered” at the time Lepre filed his notice of appeal, rendering it timely.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B).    
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Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir. 1995) (adopting Brunner test).  
Under this test, the debtor must establish: 
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a 
“minimal” standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the 
loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is 
likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student 
loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans. 
Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.  Equitable concerns or other extraneous factors may not be 
imported to support a finding of dischargeability.  Faish, 72 F.3d at 306.  Lepre must 
establish each of the three elements by a preponderance of the evidence before a 
discharge can be granted.  See Faish, 72 F.3d at 306; Brightful v. Pa. Higher Educ. 
Assistance Agency (In re Brightful), 267 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 2001). 
As explained in detail by the Bankruptcy Court, Lepre has failed to provide an 
accurate accounting of his income and expense and, as a result, has failed to establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence that he cannot maintain a “minimal” standard of living if 
forced to repay ECMC.  Specifically, while Lepre’s schedules suggest that he has a 
negative net monthly income, Lepre’s figures are unreliable.  Based upon information 
Lepre submitted at trial and his testimony, it appears that he underestimated both his 
earnings and the total amount of funds he possessed as of the filing of his schedules.  In 
addition, regarding his expenses, he appeared to have counted at least one expense twice, 
and listed expenses that he was not paying and that may not have existed, such as 
ongoing payments for college tuition.  Accordingly, without belaboring each discrepancy 
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in Lepre’s finances that the Bankruptcy Court noted in its memorandum, we agree that 
Lepre has failed to satisfy the first prong of the Brunner test.  See Faish, 72 F.3d at 306.
3
     
While the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that Lepre also did not satisfy the 
second and third prongs of the Brunner test appears well reasoned and correct, Lepre’s 
failure to satisfy the first prong alone establishes that he is not entitled to a discharge of 
his educational debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).  Accordingly, this appeal presents 
us with no substantial question, and we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order 
entered on March 25, 2013, affirming the order of the Bankruptcy Court.  See 3rd Cir. 
LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
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 In addition to his notice of appeal, Lepre filed three separate submissions concerning his appeal and the issues he 
believed that this Court needed to address.  As none of the challenged issues affect the outcome of this matter, and 
all were adequately and correctly addressed by the District Court in its order, we will not repeat the District Court’s 
determination here.   
